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HIPAA CONFUSION: HOW THE PRIVACY RULE 
AUTHORIZES "INFORMAL" DISCOVERY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year was 1995, and Jane Smith had a rewarding job as a stock 
clerk at Dave & Hubbard's Grocery Store. One day while Jane is 
restocking the dairy shelves, she slips and falls on a puddle of milk 
she spilled, landing firmly on her back. Unable to move, Jane is 
immediately taken to the hospital. Struggling to diagnose the 
ailment, the treating physician, Dr. Dolin suggests immediate 
surgery, to which Jane agrees. After the surgery, Jane is in just as 
much pain as she was prior to the surgery, and is subsequently 
diagnosed with a herniated disk. After being discharged from the 
hospital, and consulting with her attorney Mr. Jones, Jane decides 
that she wants to pursue legal action against Dr. Dolin for medical 
malpractice, and Dave & Hubbard's Grocery Store for negligence. 
Jane files a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, a contributory negligence state. l Dave & 
Hubbard's Grocery Store retains Mrs. Y as its counsel and she 
immediately begins sorting through discovery in an effort to develop 
a winnable defense. Mrs. Y notices that Jane visited Dr. Brown, a 
chiropractor, several times leading up to the incident and decides to 
pursue the lead. Complying with a recognized Maryland discovery 
practice, Mrs. Y places an initial phone call to Dr. Brown. After the 
initial call, Dr. Brown agrees to meet with Mrs. Y outside the 
presence of Mr. Jones and Jane. During her ex parte interview with 
Dr. Brown, Mrs. Y discovers that Jane suffered the herniated disk 
three years prior to the incident and has not followed Dr. Brown's 
rehabilitative advice, including his suggestion that she wear a back 
brace at work. During the trial, Mrs. Y calls Dr. Brown to testify, and 
ultimately the jury absolves both Dr. Dolin and Dave & Hubbard's 
Grocery Store of all liability. Fast forward to 2014. 
Over the course of the past decade, ex parte communications 
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs' non-party treating 
1. See, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 451, 456 A.2d 
894, 898 (1983) ("[T]he well-established law of [Maryland is] that a plaintiff who 
fails to observe ordinary care for his own safety is contributorily negligent and is 
barred from all recovery, regardless of the quantum of a defendant's primary 
negligence." (citing Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 439-40, 374 A.2d 347,353 
(1977))). 
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physicians have become almost nonexistent, a direct result of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIPAA,,)2 and its Privacy Rule.3 Prior to the promulgation of 
HIP AA, several jurisdictions4 allowed defense attorneys to 
informally communicate ex parte with plaintiffs' non-party treating 
physicians as though they were ordinary fact witnesses.5 However, 
with the passage of HIPAA, and subsequently its Privacy Rule,6 
access to personally identifiable health information underwent an 
overhaul subjecting such information to more stringent regulations.7 
Following the full implementation of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule 
in April 2003,8 there has been tremendous inconsistency in their 
application9 and interpretation. 1O As a result of these conflicting 
dispositions, defense attorneys in some jurisdictions are barred from 
using a discovery tool that is liberally allowed elsewhere. 11 Per one 
court's astute observation, "[t]he recently enacted HIPAA statute has 
2. HIPAA was signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996. Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 1320d-l to d-9 (2012». 
3. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2014); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d(l)-(9). 
4. Jurisdictions previously allowing ex parte communications with treating physicians 
include: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Rhode Island. Scott 
Aripoli, Comment, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: Has the Regulation Bitten Off More Than 
it Can Chew by Prohibiting Ex Parte Communication with Treating Physicians?, 75 
UMKC L. REV. 499, 505-06 (2006). 
5. Melissa Phillips Reading & Laura Marshall Strong, Ex Parte Communications 
Between Defense Counsel and Treating Physicians, FOR THE DEF. 30 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.og-law.comlfilesIFTD-1110-ReadingStrong.pdf. 
6. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.Gov, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
7. Compare Butler-Tulio v. Scroggins, 139 Md. App. 122, 141,774 A.2d 1209, 1219 
(2001) (finding that "when a patient puts his or her medical condition at issue in a 
[lawsuit] ... a health care provider must disclose ... all medical information [under 
the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act] ... regardless of whether the 
patient consents."), with Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004) 
(stating "HIPAA preempts MCMRA and is controlling on the issue of ex parte 
communications"). 
8. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534(a) (2014). 
9. See Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, *5-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 24, 2005) (finding "[t]he waiver of any HIP AA rights as implicit in the waiver of 
the physician-patient privilege," thus permitting ex parte communication). 
10. Crenshaw v. MaNY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004) 
("HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers."). 
11. See Holzle, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, at *20-21; see also Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 
1015. 
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[forever] changed the landscape of how [all] litigators can conduct 
informal discovery in cases involving medical treatment. ,,12 
This Comment will demonstrate that the Privacy Rule implicitly 
authorizes the exercise of ex parte communication by defense 
counsel, while also showing that the informal nature of these 
interviews no longer remains.I3 Part II will analyze HIPAA and the 
Privacy Rule, including their origins and purpose. 14 Part III will 
provide an in-depth analysis of the Privacy Rule's scope, the manner 
in which physicians may disclose protected health information, and 
sources of confusion with respect to disclosure.15 Part IV will discuss 
the background of ex parte communications, and varying judicial 
interpretations of the Privacy Rule as applied to ex parte 
communication. 16 Finally, Part V will suggest a more standardized 
reading that courts should employ when determining whether ex 
parte communication is permitted, so that future judicial 
nonconformity can be prevented. 17 
II. THE ORIGINS OF HIPAA AND ITS PROMULGA nON 
HIPAA, codified as 42 U.S.c. § 1320d, et seq.,18 was signed into 
law on August 21, 1996 by President Clinton. 19 Although HIPAA 
was not primarily enacted by Congress to serve as a federal medical 
privacy act/o its privacy implications have been the most far-reaching 
and broadly impacting part of the legislation. According to the text 
of HIP AA, its purpose was to "improve . . . the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the 
development of a health information system through the 
establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic 
transmission of certain health information.,,21 Despite the detailed 
language of HIP AA, President Clinton, when addressing the nation, 
12. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
13. See infra Parts II, Ill, and IV. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part Ill. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
I 7. See infra Part v. 
18. HIP AA was formerly known as Public Law 104-191. Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 
1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-9 (2012)). 
19. See President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Aug. 21, 1996), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=53211. 
20. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 261, 110 Stat. at 2021. 
21. Id. (emphasis added). 
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enunciated a different goal, stating "this Act will ensure the 
portability of health benefits when [workers change vocation] ... and 
will protect workers against discrimination by health plans.,,22 
While President Clinton briefly mentioned the issue of patient 
privacy in his statement regarding HIP AA,23 the privacy regulations 
of HIP AA were specifically assigned to Congress and the Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in Section 
264 of the Act.24 To accomplish the ends of HIPAA, Congress 
required that HHS develop and promulgate regulations relating to the 
privacy and protection of health information.25 Although it was not 
Congress's sole, or even primary, intention to protect the privacy of 
certain health information, HHS recognized that HIP AA could not 
fulfill its goals26 without such patient privacy protections.27 
Tasked with the creation of "a set of basic national privacy 
standards and fair information practices,,,28 HHS examined the 
existing protections and rights under state law. Ultimately, the 
drafters found that the existing protections under state law were 
lacking in two respects: (1) they failed to establish the patients' right 
to access their own health information, and (2) they failed to impose 
comprehensive protections with respect to patients' medical 
records. 29 In reference to a patient's health information,30 HHS 
22. President William J. Clinton, supra note 19. Furthermore, President Clinton 
addressed three key reforms that HIP AA would set into motion. First, it will 
eliminate the possibility that individuals can be denied coverage because they have a 
preexisting medical condition. Second it will require insurance companies to sell 
coverage to small employer groups and to individuals who lose group coverage 
without regard to their health risk status. Finally, it will require insurers to renew the 
policies they sell to groups and individuals. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 264(c)(l), 110 Stat. at 2033 ("If 
[Congress failed to enact] legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy 
of individually identifiable health information ... [ within] 36 months after the date of 
the enactment of [HIPAA], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
promulgate final regulations ... not later than the date that is 42 months after the date 
of the enactment of[HIPAA]."). 
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012). 
26. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 261, 110 Stat. at 2021. 
27. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462,82,463-64 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2014». 
28. Id. at 82, 464. 
29. Id. at 82, 463-64. 
30. Health information consists of "any information, whether oral or recorded in any form 
or medium, that is created or received by a healthcare provider ... and relates to the 
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of the individual .... " 
42 U.S.c. § 1320d-(4) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
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recognized the growing need for federal regulations regarding the use 
and disclosure of this information by covered entities.31 In support of 
their fmdings, the drafters reaffIrmed that privacy is a fundamental 
right,32 and with the advent of the Internet and electronic transmission 
systems, the likelihood of unwanted disclosure was more signifIcant 
than ever.33 Additionally, the drafters acknowledged that a patient's 
ability to receive quality health care would be generally undermined 
without sufftcient privacy protections/4 an argument frequently 
utilized by opponents of ex parte communication.35 As such, HHS 
issued a proposed Privacy Rule for the public commenting process on 
November 3, 1999.36 
After reviewing thousands of public comments, including criticism 
that "the [Privacy Rule] too harshly restricted access to 
information,,,37 HHS issued a final draft of the Privacy Rule in 
December 2000, with subsequent modifications in August 2002.38 
During the fInal public commentary in December 2000, HHS 
specifically addressed the issue of disclosing a patient's health 
information during the course of judicial proceedings.39 Nowhere in 
the response to public comments did HHS explicitly discuss the 
permissibility of ex parte communications, however, HHS did 
provide several examples in which patient health information may be 
31. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a)(3) (stating that a covered entity includes "[a] healthcare 
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form . . . ."); see 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d-(3) (defining a healthcare provider as "a provider of medical or other 
health services, ... and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies"). 
32. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,464 (stating "[a] right to privacy in personal information has historically found 
expression in American law"). 
33. See id. at 82, 465-67. 
34. See id. at 82, 466-67. 
35. J. Christopher Smith, Recognizing The Split: The Jurisdictional Treatment Of Defense 
Counsel's Ex Parte Contact With Plaintiff's Treating Physician, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 
247,251 (1999) (arguing that if patients are afforded greater privacy protections, then 
they can obtain greater medical treatment). 
36. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacylhipaa/ 
understandinglsummary/index.htrnl. 
37. REpORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL 
PRIVACY LAW 3 (2007), available at http://rcfp.orglrcfp/orders/docsIMEDPRIV.pdf. 
According to the drafters, the goal of the Privacy Rule-the part of HIP AA that 
governs public release of information-can prove so frustrating because it gives 
patients more control of the dissemination of their medical information. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Standards for Privacy ofIndividually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,529. 
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disclosed by covered entities to defense attorneys.40 Although the 
Privacy Rule's regulations relating to the disclosure of protected 
health infonnation ("PHI,,)41 are comprehensive in scheme, and 
unambiguously remove the infonnality commonly associated with ex 
parte communications, the Rule does not explicitly mention ex parte 
interviews.42 In fact, the now codified version of the Privacy Rule, 
found at 45 c.P.R. sections 160 and 164, provides an explicit 
exception to disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings.43 
III. WHEN MAY A COVERED ENTITY DISCLOSE PATIENT 
INFORMATION? 
In most instances, the Privacy Rule prohibits health care providers 
from disclosing a patient's PHI without valid authorization.44 
However, despite the Privacy Rule's applicability to both written and 
oral communications,45 there are instances in which "[a] covered 
entity may use or disclose the [PHI] without the written authorization 
of the [patient], as described in [45 C.P.R.] § 164.508,[46] or the 
opportunity for the [patient] to agree to or object as described in [45 
C.P.R.] section 164.510 .... "47 Notwithstanding the fact that there 
are exceptions pennitting disclosure of PHI, the use or disclosure of 
40. See id.; see also infra Part III.B. 
41. PHI information is defined as "individually identifiable health information ... that is: 
(i) [t]ransmitted by electronic media; (ii) [m]aintained in electronic media; or (iii) 
[t]ransmitted or maintained in any other form or medium .... " 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 
(2014). 
42. Croskey v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., No. 02-73747, 2005 WL 4704767, at *4 (E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 10, 2005). 
43. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). 
44. See id. § 164.508 (defining the uses and disclosures for which a valid authorization is 
required, and the necessary components of such a authorization); see also id. § 
l64.502(b) ("When using or disclosing [PHI] ... a covered entity ... must make 
reasonable efforts to limit [PHI] to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended 
purpose of the use, disclosure, or request."). Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
minimum necessary requirement is not applicable when "[u]se[] or disclosure[] [is] 
made pursuant to an authorization under § 164.508." Id. § 164.502(b)(2)(iii). 
45. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 130, 42 U.S.C. § 
1320d-(4) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
46. "Except as otherwise permitted or required . . . a covered entity may not use or 
disclose [PHI] without an authorization . . . and such use or disclosure must be 
consistent with such authorization." 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(I). 
47. Id. § 164.512. Notwithstanding the fact that "[a] covered entity may use or disclose 
[PHI] without ... the opportunity for the individual to agree or object," id. § 164.512, 
under the judicial proceedings subsection it is required that an opportunity be made 
available "to permit the individual to raise an objection . . .." Id. § 
164.512( e)( I )(iii)(B). 
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this private information must still comply with the limitations 
enunciated in the Privacy Rule.48 Of the six possible disclosure 
exceptions set forth in the Privacy Rule,49 only one, in conjunction 
with its relevant cross-referenced section, permits the use or 
disclosure of PHI in ex parte communications.50 
A. The "Required By Law" Exception and State Law Preemption 
While subsections (a)51 and (e) of 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 are both 
relevant to ex parte communication, subsection (a) produces a large 
portion of the confusion in judicial application. Subsection (a) of 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512 establishes an exception whereby a covered entity 
may use or disclose PHI without first obtaining written patient 
authorization if the "disclosure is required by law."52 According to 
the drafters of the Privacy Rule, a disclosure is "required by law" if 
"a mandate [exists] that compels a [covered] entity to make a use or 
disclosure of [PHI] and that is enforceable in a court of law."53 As 
such, a disclosure "required by law" includes, but is not limited to, 
court orders, subpoenas, and statutes.54 Despite this seeming 
exception, a health care provider's disclosure of PHI is impermissible 
without a threshold inquiry under HIPAA's preemption language. 55 
Under its preemption scheme, "[HIPAA] shall supersede any 
contrary provision of State law."56 A state law is contrary in the eyes 
of HIP AA if "[ a] covered entity . . . would find it impossible to 
comply with both the State and Federal requirements;[57] or [t]he 
provision of State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [HIP AA]. ,,58 
Although it may not have been the intent of the drafters to make 
things more difficult for the judiciary, HIPAA provides an exception 
stating that it will not preempt a State law if the law provides the 
48. ld. § 164.502(a) (stating that use or disclosure must comply with the Privacy Rule). 
49. ld. § 164.502(a)(l)(i)-(vi). 
50. See id. § 164.502(a)(I)(i)-(v). 
51. ld. § 164.512(a)(I)(v) (referencing when use or disclosure requires the patient to agree 
or object); see also id. § 164.510 (discussing when use or disclosure requires the 
patient to agree or object). 
52. Jd. § 164.512(a)( 1). 
53. ld. § 164.103. 
54. ld. 
55. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1320, 42 U.S.c. § 
1320d-7(a)(l) (2012). 
56. Id. 
57. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. 
58. ld. 
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patients with "more stringent" protections than those available in the 
Privacy Rule.59 As such, one of the most common difficulties 
plaguing courts interpreting the Privacy Rule is their inability to 
make the threshold determination as to whether State law and Federal 
law are contrary.60 
This initial threshold analysis is crucial because if two laws are not 
contrary, they generally can be reconciled without one law 
preempting the other, thereby eliminating the need for a more 
problematic stringency analysis.61 Currently, the Privacy Rule's 
definitions of "contrary" significantly narrow the occasions in which 
a State law and HIPAA will in fact be contrary.62 The seminal 
Maryland case Law v. Zuckerman63 provides a prime example of a 
court properly recognizing that a State law is contrary to HIP AA, but 
unnecessarily analyzing the "more stringent" requirement.64 
In Law, the Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against her 
physician for injuries allegedly sustained during the removal of 
abnormal cells in surgery.65 During the course of discovery, defense 
counsel had ex parte communications with Plaintiffs non-party 
treating physician.66 In support of his actions, Defendant's attorney 
argued that the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act67 
governed the case, not HIPAA.68 In rejecting defense counsel's 
argument, the court erroneously relied upon the "more stringent" 
exception to the Privacy Rule, interpreting "more stringent" to mean 
"the [increased] ability of the patient to withhold permission and to 
effectively block disclosure [of their PHI]. ,,69 By relying on this 
59. /d. In order to meet the "more stringent" requirement, the law must "provide[] greater 
privacy protection for the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable 
health information." Id. 
60. See Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIP AA Privacy Rule with State Laws Regulating 
Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing HIPAA 
Preemption Analysis, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1091, 1129-31 (2006). 
61. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202-.203. 
62. See id. § 160.202. 
63. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004). 
64. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(6); Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709-11. 
65. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 707. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 709. According to the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, "[a] 
health care provider shall disclose a medical record without the authorization of a 
person in interest ... [t]o ... legal counsel, all information in a medical record 
relating to a patient or recipient's health, health care or treatment which forms the 
basis for the issues of a claim .... " MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-306(b)(3) 
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
68. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
69. Id. at 711. 
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exception, the Law court failed to apply the "General Rule" that 
"[HIPAA] shall supersede any contrary provision of State law.,,70 
Rather than stating "[i]f [a] state law can force disclosure ... it is not 
'more stringent' than . . . HIP AA,,,71 the court more appropriately 
should have found that "[i]f [a] state law can force disclosure" it is 
"impossible to comply with both the State and Federal requirements," 
thus triggering HIP AA preemption.72 This case of first impression 
not only misapplied the HIP AA preemption analysis, it created 
flawed precedent for the Fourth Circuit. 73 
Although HHS affirmed during its final public commenting process 
that the Privacy Rule was not intended to disrupt existing legal 
obligations,74 the aforementioned HIPAA preemption provision does 
just that.75 In fact, the Privacy Rule not only disrupts existing legal 
obligations, it also places an undue burden on the jUdiciary. While 
HIP AA may preempt any "required" state law "contrary" to it, it does 
not necessarily follow that court-permitted ex parte communications 
are preempted as well. 
1. HIP AA and the Physician-Patient Privilege 
In addition to the difficulty in determining whether or not a state 
law is contrary to HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, courts post-HIPAA 
have also grappled with the application of the physician-patient 
privilege. Historically, "[f]ederal common law has not . . . 
recognized a privilege between patients and physicians.,,76 Therefore, 
many states have chosen to codify the privilege.77 However, it is well 
settled that when a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit thereby placing PHI at 
issue, that privilege is waived, "thereby subjecting the [private] 
70. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 1320, 42 U.S.C. § 
1320d-(7)(a)(1) (2012). 
71. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
72. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014). 
73. See Piehl v. Saheta, No. CCB-13-254, 2013 WL 2470128, at *1-2 (D. Md. June 5, 
2013) (viewing "a 'more stringent state law' is any law that gives patients increased 
control over their own medical records" (citing Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709)). 
74. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462,82,668 (Dec. 28,2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) ("The [Privacy] 
[R]ule's approach is simply intended to avoid any obstruction to the health plan or 
covered health care provider's ability to comply with its existing legal obligations."). 
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a). 
76. United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 2007). 
77. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (McKinney 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-2-101 
(2012). 
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information to discovery.,,78 Post-HIPAA, courts have addressed the 
issue of whether or not the "waiver,,79 principle has remained intact, 
and they have struggled to analyze its effect on ex parte 
communication. 
In Thomas v. Ontario Inc., the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan found that, unlike Michigan law, which 
permits ex parte communications following plaintiffs waiver of the 
physician-patient privilege, HIP AA does not allow for an automatic 
waiver of the privilege.80 However, the Thomas court did not base its 
finding on a HIPAA created physician-patient privilege;81 rather, the 
court emphasized the goal of HIP AA in ensuring the security and 
privacy of health information.82 Additionally, the Thomas court 
found that HIP AA and the Privacy Rule implemented several 
regulatory exceptions specifically tailored to the disclosure of 
information during litigation proceedings.83 While it can be argued 
that this interpretation of HIP AA and the federal physician-patient 
privilege is most accurate, one certainty remains: this decision 
represents a vastly differing view when compared to neighboring 
jurisdictions. 
In the case of National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,84 the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
quashed a government subpoena for medical records citing HIPAA's 
recognition of the "importance of the privacy of medical records.,,85 
In the opinion, Judge Charles Kocoras found that HIP AA, in 
conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 501, compelled the 
recognition of a federal physician-patient privilege.86 Furthermore, in 
rejecting the plaintiffs argument that no physician-patient privilege 
existed under common law, the Ashcroft court found that HIPAA and 
its privacy regulations governed privilege, not Federal Rule of 
78. Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 182 F. Supp. 2d 370,381 (D. Del. 2002); Daniel 
M. Roche, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, HIPAA 'S EJfect on Informal Discovery in Products 
Liability and Personal Injury Cases, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1094 (2006). 
79. See Holamn v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391, 391-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), aJf'd, 764 
N.W.2d 583 (Mich. 2009). 
80. Thomas v. 1156729 Ontario Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 780,783 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
81. Id. at 782. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 783; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014) (outlining federal statutory 
provisions allowing disclosure of health care information). 
84. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-C-55, 2004 WL 292079, at *2 (N.D. 111. 
Feb. 6, 2004), ajJ'd, 362 F.3d 923 (7th CiT. 2004). 
85. Id. at *2, *6-7 (quoting United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609,612 (W.D. 
Va. 2001». 
86. Id. at *4-6. 
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Evidence 501, because they were produced by an "[a]ct of 
Congress.,,87 Within a matter of months, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion directly 
contradicting Ashcroft. 88 
In writing for a split Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner found 
that all HIP AA and its privacy regulations "should be understood to 
do ... is to create a procedure for obtaining authority to use medical 
records in litigation ... [and][w]e do not think HIPAA is rightly 
understood as an Act of Congress that creates a privilege.,,89 These 
two cases not only plainly show the varying interpretation within the 
same circuit-albeit the district court and the appellate court-but 
they also illustrate the growing possibility of forum shopping with 
respect to HIP AA interpretation. 
For example, in Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., the New 
York Supreme Court addressed the growing inconsistency among 
courts within the jurisdiction with respect to the physician-patient 
privilege and HIPAA.90 In its analysis, the Holzle court disregarded 
the holdings of other justices "seem[ing] to infer that the Privacy 
Rule provides substantive rights for plaintiffs .... ,,91 Despite its 
dismissal of previous interpretations and applications of HIP AA and 
the Privacy Rule to ex parte communication and the physician-patient 
privilege, the Holzle court nevertheless reviewed the case, assuming 
arguendo, that the Privacy Rule did create some form of rights for the 
plaintiff in litigation.92 Even under this interpretation, the court found 
that by bringing a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff 
affirmatively places their mental or physical condition at issue, "that 
party waives any rights or remedies under HIP AA as to the . . . 
conditions asserted in the litigation.,,93 
In support of its disposition, the Holzle court provided a more well-
reasoned argument than "HIP AA rights [ act] as a sword against 
defendants but as a shield for plaintiffs [that] would have [an] unfair 
result.,,94 The court reasoned that the waiver of HIPAA rights is as 
implicit as the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in 
87. Jd. at *5. 
88. Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004). 
89. Jd. at 925-26. 
90. Holzle v. Health Servs. Grp., No. 110376, 2005 WL 1252597, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 24, 2005). 
91. Jd. at *6. 
92. Jd. 
93. Jd. (emphasis added). 
94. Jd. at *6. 
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jurisdictions recognizing such a privilege.95 More significantly, the 
court found that the implicit HIP AA waiver approach is "consistent 
with the principles of separation of powers and statutory 
construction.,,96 Furthennore, the court found that by not forcing 
unwanted authorizations on plaintiffs, the concern about creating 
legislation or regulatory schemes without the guidance of the 
Legislature dissipated.97 
Conversely, if the plaintiff in Holzle had filed their complaint in a 
different New York venue, assuming arguendo, that the procedural 
requirements were met, a considerably different result would have 
ensued.98 In the case of Keshecki v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr.,99 the 
New York Supreme Court for Richmond County, recognized that the 
physician-patient confidentiality privilege had been codified in New 
York state law for over 175 years. lOO Furthennore, the court also 
found that plaintiffs generally waive certain privacy rights when they 
claim an injury because defendants are entitled to discover the nature 
of their injuries. 101 However, the court ultimately held that the 
Privacy Rule preempted New York law regarding ex parte 
communications because the New York law offered less stringent 
privacy protections. 102 Therefore, the court ruled that "HIP AA 
protects the privacy of the plaintiff ... [and] [t]he only adequate 
remedy to protect that right is to preclude any evidence obtained 
contrary to [HIPAA] safeguards.,,103 
While all of the aforementioned cases still remain "good law," only 
one interpretation confonns to the legislative intent, the plain 
meaning. Under the plain meaning canon of , statutory construction, 
courts adhere to the principle that if the words of a statute are clear 
and unambiguous, the court need not inquire any further into the 
meaning of the statute. 104 With respect to HIP AA and the Privacy 
Rule, courts need only look to the language of the statute when 
determining whether a state law is preempted by HIP AA. "The 




98. See, e.g., Keshecki v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (NY. Sup. Ct. 
2004) (rejecting the implied waiver theory and holding that HIPPA requires 
authorization from the patient before private physician interviews are conducted). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 302. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 303. 
103. Id. at 305. 
104. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003). 
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to 'presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there. ",105 HIP AA and the Privacy 
Rule provide the judiciary with a step-by-step guide in determining 
whether a state law is more stringent than HIP AA or whether state 
law is contrary, which minimizes the risks of nonconformity that may 
result from judicial discretion. Additionally, during the public 
commenting process, the drafters explicitly stated that they did "not 
intend for the privacy regulation to interfere with . . . state rules of 
evidence that create privileges. ,,\06 Were it Congress' and HHS' 
intention to create such a privilege, it is likely that more direct and 
specific language would have been used, similarly to other statutorily 
created privileges. l07 
There are several noteworthy arguments as to why a federal 
physician-patient privilege is needed now, including the fact that 
physicians possess a greater wealth of patient health information than 
ever before, \08 advances in technology pose new potential threats to 
patient privacy,109 and there is an increasing number of individuals 
with access to patients' medical information. llo While all of these 
concerns are valid, they fail to account for the fact that when HIP AA 
and the Privacy Rule were being promulgated, the drafters were 
readily cognizant of these potential dangers, so much so that they 
extended the privacy requirements well beyond the required 
minimum. III In essence, the proponents of a federally enacted 
physician-patient privilege are implying that the privacy protections 
provided by HIP AA are insufficient and fail to achieve their intended 
end. 
105. BedRoc, Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citing Conn. Nat'l 
Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). 
106. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462,82,597 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
107. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2006) (stating that certain reports "shall not be subject to 
discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding"). 
108. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation For A 
Federal Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 505, 520 (2004). 
109. Id. at 521. 
11 O. Id. at 524. 
111. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, Sec. 264(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d). Under the pre-codified version of 
HlPAA, HHS was required to address only "the rights that [a patient] who is [the] 
subject of individually identifiable health infonnation should haver,] the procedures 
that should be established for the exercise of such rights[, and] [t]he use[] and 
disclosures of such infonnation that should be authorized or required." !d. 
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However, this argument is flawed in that it fails to recognize that 
HIP AA and the Privacy Rule act as a federally created floor which 
only permits the disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings if 
certain procedural requirements are met. 112 Therefore, if the judiciary 
appropriately applies the preemption scheme, as explicitly stated in 
the plain language of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, the need for a 
federal physician-patient privilege ceases to exist. Accordingly, in a 
jurisdiction where an individual waives the statutorily created 
physician-patient privilege by filing a lawsuit, a judge reading the 
plain language of HIP AA and the Privacy Rule will see that the state 
law is "contrary" II 3 to, not "more stringent,,114 than HIPAA, thus 
triggering the federally created privacy protections. I IS 
B. The "Judicial Proceedings" Exception to PHI Disclosure 
By the time of full compliance in April 2003,116 more than a dozen 
states and the District of Columbia expressly permitted ex parte 
interviews with plaintiffs' non-party treating physicians. 117 Despite 
the effect that HIP AA and the Privacy Rule had on the dissemination 
of PHI, nowhere among HIPAA's express provisions, or even 
HIP AA' s legislative history, is any reference made to ex parte 
communication. 118 However, under the judicial proceedings 
exception, drafted by HHS and enacted by Congress, ex parte 
communication with health care providers is implicitly allowed. 119 
112. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014); see also discussion infra Part I1LB (describing the 
requirements necessary for disclosure of PHI during judicial proceedings). 
113. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. 
114. Id. By analyzing the plain meaning of a State law, a judge should be able to tell 
whether the law provides greater privacy protections with respect to individuals' 
identifiable health infonnation, or greater rights to individuals with respect to that 
infonnation. 
115. See 42 U.S.c. § 1320d-(7)(a)(l) (2012); see also Holamn v. Rasak, 761 N.W.2d 391, 
393 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd, 485 NW.2d 98 (Mich. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 913 (2011) ("Under HIPAA ... the filing of a lawsuit does not waive the 
confidentiality of health information .... "); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (providing the 
definition of both "contrary" and "more stringent"). 
116. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
117. Aripoli, supra note 4, at 506. 
118. Bruce R. Parker & D.S. Gray, The Impact of HIPAA on Ex Parte Interviews with 
Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians: Preemption or Red Herring?, DRUG, DEVICE & 
BIOTECH COMM. NEWSL. (Int'I Assoc. of Def. Counsel, Chicago, III.), Dec. 2003, at 3-
4, reprinted in HIPPA [sic] and Interviews: Pre-emption or Red Herring?, 71 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 208, 211 (2004). 
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (stating that "[a] covered entity may disclose protected health 
infonnation [without authorization] in the course of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding"). 
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Pursuant to the Privacy Rule's regulations, a health care provider 
may release PHI without the patient's authorization pursuant to a 
court order "provided that the covered entity discloses only the [PHI] 
expressly authorized by such order.,,12o Alternatively, PHI may be 
released pursuant to "a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful 
process."l2l Unlike the first provision, the second provision contains 
a notable caveat: where no formal court order exists, the covered 
entity must receive from the defendant requesting PHI either 
"satisfactory assurance[ s]" or a "qualified protective order" before 
disclosing the PHI. 122 The satisfactory assurances requirement 
represents a clear divergence from pre-HIPAA ex parte 
communications in that this provision places the opposing party on 
notice. 123 The covered entity receives satisfactory assurances when 
the defendants' attorney demonstrates his or her good faith effort to 
provide written notice to the plaintiff. 124 Additionally, the notice 
must include "sufficient information about the litigation" so that the 
patient may object to the disclosure.125 Finally, the assurance must 
show that the time for objection to the disclosure has lapsed and that 
the patient did not file any objections, or that the court resolved all 
pending objections. 126 
With respect to satisfactory assurances regarding qualified 
protective orders, the requesting attorney must demonstrate in writing 
that "the parties . . . agreed to a qualified protective order and . . . 
presented it to the COurt,,,127 or "[t]he party seeking the protected 
health information has requested a qualified protective order. ,,128 The 
Privacy Rule has established a two prong restriction for a qualified 
protective order in that it prohibits the parties from using or 
disclosing the PHI beyond the scope of the pending litigation, and 
requires the return or destruction of the health information, including 
copies, at the end of the litigation. 129 
While none of these provisions expressly prohibit or allow ex parte 
communication some may argue that the judicial exception has a 
120. !d. § 164.512(e)(l)(i). 
121. !d. § 164.512(e)(l)(ii). 
122. Id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. § 164.512(e)(l)(ii)-(iii)(A). 
125. Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(B). 
126. Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(C)(l)-(2). 
127. Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iv)(A). 
128. Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(iv)(B) (emphasis added). 
129. Id. § 164.512(e)(l)(v)(A) -(B). 
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practical effect of ending the practice. 130 However, there is a 
significant difference between interpreting HIP AA as an outright 
prohibition of ex parte communication,131 and interpreting the statute 
to make the practice more formaL 132 The purpose of this Comment is 
not to argue that the pre-HIPAA informal discovery practices are 
alive and well, but rather to address the glaring inconsistencies 
arising primarily out of the judicial proceedings exception, and 
suggest how a federal statute intended to increase privacy rights is 
misapplied in many jurisdictions. 
IV. HIPAA'S IMPACT ON EX PARTE COMMUNICATION 
WITH PHYSICIANS 
Ex parte communication with non-party treating physicians is a 
long-established method of discovery that provides benefits to both 
plaintiffs and defendants. 133 First, and most importantly, ex parte 
communication removes barriers that prevent parties from obtaining 
the candid truth.134 By allowing ex parte communication, courts open 
a line of communication that is more conducive to spontaneity and 
less intimidating than depositions. Secondly, ex parte 
communication by definition permits only the interviewing party to 
be present. 135 Therefore, by requiring one party to forgo their 
presence, this invariably saves valuable time, allowing for better trial 
preparation. 136 In addition to saving time for both parties in 
preparation and attendance of depositions, ex parte communications 
provide a societal benefit; by saving non-party physicians from 
130. "Ex parte communications between defense counsel and a plaintiffs treating 
physician for the purpose of gaining a strategic advantage in the defense of a civil 
lawsuit therefore violate both the letter and the spirit of [HIPAA]." David G. Wirtes, 
Jr. et aI., An Important Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte Communications 
Between Defense Attorneys and Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians, 27 AM. J. TRIAL 
AovOC. I, 9 (2003). 
131. See Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004) 
("HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers."). 
132. See Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering that the 
qualified protective order state in bold letters that the infonnation sought is to assist 
the defendant in defense of a lawsuit brought by plaintiff). 
133. Angela T. Burnette & D'Andrea J. Morning, HIPAA and Ex Parte Interviews-The 
Beginning of the End?, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 76-77 (2008). "[E]x parte 
interviews are quicker and more efficient than fonnal discovery in that they reduce the 
time needed to prepare for trial." John Jennings, The Physician-Patient Relationship: 
The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff's Treating 
Physicians and Defense Counsel, 50 Mo. L. REv. 441,458 (1994). 
134. J. Christopher Smith, supra note 35, at 252. 
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 316 (9th ed. 2009). 
136. See Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77. 
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attending time-consuming depositions, they are better able to perform 
their medical obligations. 137 One judge post-HIP AA has gone as far 
as to say that requiring a deposition in lieu of ex parte communication 
"significantly interfer[es] with the practice of medicine.,,138 Finally, 
ex parte communication is efficient and cost effective in that it allows 
parties to evaluate potential witnesses without unnecessary spending 
on discovery. 139 
Despite these benefits, prior to HIP AA and the promulgation of the 
Privacy Rule, numerous policy arguments existed disfavoring ex 
parte communication. An argument frequently relied upon by 
plaintiffs in opposition to ex parte communications "is the [ risk] of a 
physician revealing confidential information unrelated to the 
lawsuit.,,140 This was a legitimate concern pre-HIPAA, however, 
currently it is without merit. Through the promulgation of the 
Privacy Rule, Congress imposed limitations regarding what 
information a physician may disclose during ex parte interviews. 141 
Under the Privacy Rule's judicial proceedings exception, "only ... 
[PHI] expressly authorized [by the court]" may be disclosed during 
these ex parte communications. 142 
The most predominant argument disfavoring the communications is 
that "ex parte [interviews] yield no greater evidence ... than that 
which is already obtainable through the regular methods of 
discovery.,,143 Although more formal methods of discovery are 
available, this argument fails to recognize that these litigious 
alternatives subj ect physicians to unnecessary cross-examination, 144 
and are more costly than practices such as ex parte interviews.145 
While the policy behind ex parte interviews has been highly 
contested, prior to the promulgation of HIP AA and the Privacy Rule 
these communications "created little controversy.,,146 Since HIPAA's 
promulgation, the arguments from the plaintiffs and defense counsel 
have shifted dramatically. Public policy is no longer the crux of the 
argument; now the plaintiff bar and defense bar are in dispute as to 
137. Id. 
138. Kish v. Graham, 88 N.Y.S.2d 313, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (Pine, 1., dissenting). 
139. Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77. 
140. Bobby Russ, Can We Talk? The Rest Of The Story Or Why Defense Attorneys Should 
Not Talk to the Plaintiff's Doctors, 39 TENN. B.l., Feb. 2003, at 29. 
141. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(I)(i) (2014). 
142. Id. 
143. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
144. See Burnette & Morning, supra note 133, at 77. 
145. Id. 
146. Ottinger v. Mausner, No. 1527/04, slip op. at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 2006). 
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whether HIP AA' s Privacy Rule establishes an outright prohibition 
against ex parte interviews. 147 The arguments presented by both 
plaintiffs and defense counsels have resulted in three vastly different 
categories of court interpretations. 
The first of these categories can be classified as judicial 
interpretations, which holds that ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs 
non-party physician violate HIP AA' s Privacy Rule. 148 The second 
category of judicial interpretation can be classified as holding ex 
parte communication may occur, but only if the procedural 
requirements of the Privacy Rule are met. 149 The final category of 
interpretations is characterized as dispositions finding that HIP AA 
does not apply to ex parte discovery, or alternatively, questioning its 
applicability. 150 These varying interpretations of the same statute, 
some even within the same jurisdiction,151 exemplify the need for 
immediate clarification of HIP AA and the Privacy Rule. 
A. HIP AA Prohibits Ex Parte Communication With Physicians 
When looking to the source of these inconsistent dispositions, one 
need only look to 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(e)152 and 160.202.153 As 
previously discussed in Part lILA., when a State law is "[ c ]ontrary,,154 
to HIP AA in order for the law to not be preempted, it must be 
"[m]ore stringent,,155 than the requirements of the Privacy Rule. In 
many cases, courts are struggling both to distinguish between 
contrary and more stringent; specifically, these cases are focusing on 
whether the law "provides greater privacy protection for the [patient] 
who is the subject of the [PHI].,,156 
147. See Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004); see also Crenshaw v. 
MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1027-1030 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
148. See EEOC v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227, 2004 WL 3327264, at *1-5 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,2004). 
149. See Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 708; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014) (elaborating 
on the procedures for disclosure). 
150. See Holzle v. Health Servs. Grp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (May 24, 2005). 
15l. Compare Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that a 
HIPAA-compliant qualified protective order allowed ex parte communication), with 
Holzle, 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, at *6 (May 24, 2005) (finding that plaintiff waived HIPAA 
rights when she placed her medical condition at issue). 
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). 
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In the case of Law v. Zuckerman,157 the Fourth Circuit addressed 
HIP AA and ex parte communication as a matter of first impression. 158 
Although the mandated provision of the Maryland Confidentiality of 
Medical Records Act was contrary to HIP AA in that a covered entity 
could not comply with both State and Federal law, the court 
interpreted "greater privacy protection,,159 erroneously. 160 This 
interpretation established precedent not only contrary to the drafter's 
intentions, but to the judicial disclosure exception as well. In the 
comments to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information, HHS stated: 
The provisions in [section 164.S12(e)] are not intended to 
disrupt current practice whereby an individual who is a 
party to a proceeding and has put his or her medical 
condition at issue will not prevail without consenting to the 
production of his or her protected health information. In 
such cases, we presume that parties will have ample notice 
and an opportunity to object in the context of the proceeding 
in which the individual is a party. 161 
Although the court in Law ultimately recognized that ex parte 
communications were permitted so long as HIP AA's disclosure 
requirements were satisfied,162 this overly stringent interpretation set 
the tone for the Fourth Circuit, and established persuasive authority 
for neighboring state courts. 163 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of HIP AA and 
ex parte communication in the case of Alsip v. Johnson City Med. 
Ctr.l64 In Alsip, defense counsel sought an order allowing their' 
attorneys to conduct ex parte interviews with the decedent's non-
party treating physician. 165 The trial court granted the order; 
however, the appellate court found that the order was an abuse of 
157. Law v. Zuckennan, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004). 
158. Id. at 706-07. 
159. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. 
160. See supra Part III.A. 
161. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82, 462, 82, 530 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (emphasis 
added). 
162. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
163. See Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., No. E2004-00831-COA-R9-CV, 2005 WL 
1536192, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27,2005), aff'd, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006). 
164. !d. at *9-10. 
165. Id. at *2. 
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judicial discretion because HIP AA did not permit ex parte 
communication. 166 Rather than performing the HIP AA balancing test 
to determine whether state law is contrary, the appellate court relied 
almost entirely on Givens v. Mullikin167 and the waiver of physician-
patient privilege. 168 In dicta, the coUI1 reaffirmed Law v. 
Zuckerman's definition of "more stringent,,,169 ultimately concluding 
that pre-HIPAA, "[ex parte] discussions were once the order of the 
day, [but] that day has, for better or for worse, come to an end.,,170 
Although the Alsip decision remains at the far end of the ex parte 
communication spectrum, the disposition shows a complete disregard 
for the procedural requirements established in HIPAA's Privacy 
Rule. 171 Within a matter of years, the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Tennessee reevaluated ex parte 
communication, in compliance with the Privacy Rule's procedural 
requirements, and reached a vastly different conclusion.172 In a case 
of first impression within this district, the Wade v. Vabnick-Wener 
court found that "[a]fter the requisite protective order is entered ... 
defendant is free to utilize informal discovery, including ex parte 
interviews, under HIP AA." 173 These contradicting decisions within 
the same state offer support for the notion that if the judiciary cannot, 
sua sponte, systemically walk through the HIP AA analysis, then a 
legislatively enacted instrument must be in place to help guide 
them. 174 
In response to the inconsistent dispositions within its own state, the 
Tennessee legislature amended the Medical Malpractice statute with 
what has fittingly been referred to as the "Givens Fix.,,175 Under the 
166. Id. at *9-10. 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); Alsip, 2005 WL 1536192, at *10; see also Givens v. 
Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002). 
168. See Givens, 75 S.W.3d at 405. 
169. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705,711 (D. Md. 2004). 
170. Alsip, 2005 WL 1536192, at *9-10. 
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014). 
172. See Wade v. Vabnick-Wener, 922 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Tenn. 2010). 
173. Id. at 685-86,691. 
174. See generally Nancy Efle & Anne Talcott, Procedural Hurdles: HIPAA and Ex Parte 
Contact With the Treating Physician, FOR THE DEF., May 2006, at 60, 61-65 
(discussing the varied and at times contradicting results courts have reached regarding 
HlPPA 's Privacy Rule); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(f) (2012 & Supp. 
2014) (providing an example of legislation that provides guidance for HIPPA 
compliance within a "health care liability action"). 
175. Jennifer Pearson Taylor & Angela L. Morris, Legal Matters: The - Givens Fix Ex 
Parte Communication between Non-Party Physicians and Defense Attorneys, E. 
TENN. MED. NEWS, (Aug. 07, 2012), http://www.easttnmedicalnews.comlcontentJ 
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"Givens Fix" defendants may petition the court upon the filing of a 
medical malpractice suit, "for a qualified protective order allowing 
the defendant or defendant and their attorneys the right to obtain 
[PHI] during interviews, outside the presence of claimant or 
claimant's counsel .... "176 In essence, the Tennessee legislature 
adopted part of the Privacy Rule's judicial proceedings exception, 
incorporating it into the state code. While this legislative action 
appears to solve the issue of whether ex parte communications are 
allowed, there are several negative implications of which other states 
should be aware before following in Tennessee's footsteps. 
First and foremost, by incorporating part of the Privacy Rule into 
the state code, Tennessee has not eliminated the future need to 
address HIPAA's applicability. The "Givens Fix," while almost 
verbatim conforming to the judicial proceedings exception, still fails 
to address what must be done with the PHI following the completion 
of the lawsuit. 177 This minor omission will likely have complicating 
results. If a clever plaintiff were to argue that HIP AA provides more 
stringent privacy protections than the "Givens Fix," which it 
essentially does,178 then courts will be right back where they started, 
almost as if the "Givens Fix" never existed. Additionally, Tennessee 
courts and other states choosing to incorporate part of the Privacy 
Rule, could engage in definitional manipulation to completely bar ex 
parte communication. Neither HIP AA nor the Privacy Rule define 
"in the course Of,179 or a "judicial or administrative proceeding,,,180 or 
expressly state whether the term should be given its common, narrow, 
or broad definition. 181 Therefore, if state legislatures wish to avoid 
future judicial nonconformity, not only should they codify aspects of 
the Privacy Rule, they also should define the aforementioned phrases. 
While some jurisdictions, such as Tennessee, have taken steps to 
address inconsistent dispositions, many have remained firm in their 
opinion that HIP AA prohibits ex parte communication. In the case of 
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of California issued a highly inconsistent 
legal-matters-givens-fix%C2%9D-ex-parte-communication-between-non-party-
physicians-and-defense. 
176. § 29-26-121(f)(1). 
177. See id. 
178. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. State ex reI. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Mo. 2010). 
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opinion regarding HIP AA and ex parte communication. 182 In 
Crenshaw, the Plaintiff sought to disqualify an expert physician with 
whom the Defendant's counsel had communicated ex parte. 183 
Because California law did not prohibit all ex parte contact, the court 
found that such practices were in conflict with the letter and spirit of 
HIP AA. 184 After determining that the communication did not fall 
within HIPAA's disclosure requirements, the court stated "HIPAA 
does not authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.,,185 To 
further add to the already glaring inconsistencies in its own opinion, 
the court found that PHI can be disclosed if the requirements of 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(e) are satisfied. 186 Crenshaw, like Law, represents 
the judiciary'S growing tendency to liberally construe the Privacy 
Rule to fit each individual case before it, exemplifying the growing 
lack of uniformity with respect to HIP AA application. 
The aforementioned cases represent the most conservative 
interpretation of HIPAA's stance on ex parte communications. 
Although HIP AA undoubtedly formalized the ex parte process, it was 
not the intention of the drafters to eliminate the practice entirely.187 
In fact, Congress sought to better regulate the practice. 188 These 
courts' liberal construction of the unambiguous language of HIP AA' s 
Privacy Rule has subsequently established bad precedent for future 
personal injury cases. 
B. HIP AA Permits Ex Parte Communications On A Limited Basis 
In regards to jurisdictions taking the middle ground approach, 
several have held that ex parte interviews can be conducted only if 
certain requirements are met. In the case of Smith v. Rafalin, the 
Supreme Court of New York directed the Plaintiff to sign HIP AA-
compliant authorizations permitting defense counsel to speak 
privately with Plaintiffs treating physicians. 189 In support of its 
directive, the court recognized equal access to potential evidence, 
stating "no party is entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a 
witness, however partial or important to him .... "190 Although the 
182. See Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
183. ld. at 1021. 
184. ld. at 1028. 
185. ld. at 1029. 
186. ld. at 1028-29. 
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014). 
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (detailing the 
regulations for disclosure in proceedings). 
189. Smith v. Rafalin, 800 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2005). 
190. ld. 
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disposition in Smith was initially declined to follow by the court in 
Arons v. Jutkowitz,191 the Court of Appeals of New York reversed, 
holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action could be 
compelled to execute HIPAA-compliant authorizations for ex parte 
communication. 192 Once again, the court found that "[a] party should 
not be pennitted to affinnatively assert a medical condition in 
seeking damages ... while simultaneously relying on [privacy] as a 
sword to thwart the opposition in its efforts to uncover facts critical to 
disputing the party's claim."193 
With respect to jurisdictions interpreting and applying HIP AA and 
the Privacy Rule, New York has established some of the most 
inconsistent case law regarding ex parte communication. 194 Within a 
year of the EEOC opinion,195 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the 
validity of ex parte interviews.196 In recognizing that "[a]bsent within 
the four comers" of HIP AA is "any mention of . . . ex parte 
interview[s]," the court in Bayne v. Provost granted the defendant's 
request for a qualified protective order to conduct ex parte 
interviews. 197 However, finding that HIPAA preempted New York 
law in respect to "more stringent" privacy protections, the Bayne 
court took it upon itself to add to the privacy protections in 
HIPAA. 198 
In granting the qualified protective order, the Bayne court ordered 
that the defendant include in the protective order "that the purpose of 
the infonnation is to assist the Defendants in defense of a lawsuit 
brought by the Plaintiff," and advise the covered entity that this court 
order "does not compel her to participate."199 This case represents 
just one of many judicial interpretations in which the court recognizes 
that HIP AA preempts state patient privacy laws. However, in its 
191. See Arons v. Jutkowitz, 825 N.Y.S.2d 738, 742-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 880 
N.E.2d 831, 838 (N.Y. 2007). 
192. Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 837-38. 
193. Id. (quoting Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989)). 
194. See id.; see also Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); EEOC v. 
Bos. Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227,2004 WL 3327264 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,2004). 
195. Bas. Mkt. Corp., 2004 WL 3327264 (holding that "ex parte communications regarding 
the disclosure of health information, while not expressly prohibited by HIP AA, create 
... too great a risk of running afoul of that statute's strong federal policy in favor of 
protecting the privacy of patient medical records."). 
196. Bayne, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 234. 
197. Id. at 240, 243. 
198. Id. at 241-42; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2014) (defining "more stringent"). 
199. Bayne, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 243. 
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application of the Privacy Rule, the court overstretched the express 
definition of qualified protective order found therein.20o The Privacy 
Rule unambiguously defines a qualified protective order as an order 
of the court "[prohibiting] the parties from using or disclosing the 
[PHI] for any purpose other than the litigation . . . and requires the 
return . . . or destruction of the [PHI] at the end of the litigation. ,,201 
Therefore, by acknowledging that HIPAA preempts New York state 
disclosure laws, the court bound itself to the application of HIP AA' s 
regulations. 
C. Dispositions Questioning HIP AA 's Validity and Applicability 
The final category of dispositions truly emphasizes the lack of 
uniformity and uncertainty as to the effect of HIP AA on ex parte 
communications. In the case of Smith v. American Home Products 
Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceutical, plaintiffs filed a products 
liability suit against the defendant for producing an allegedly harmful 
pharmaceutical drug.202 In undertaking a complete HIPAA analysis, 
the Smith court recognized that HIP AA was more stringent than New 
Jersey law in certain respects, and conversely New Jersey law was 
more stringent in other respects. 203 After weighing the true policy 
behind HIP AA, the court found that this policy goal is not diminished 
through the use of ex parte communication.204 Similar to other 
dispositions, the Smith court relied on the fact that "informal 
discovery is not expressly addressed under HIP AA,,,205 therefore, 
"courts should be governed by state law.,,206 In the Smith court's 
view, New Jersey had "established confidentiality protections" that 
provided adequate privacy to patient's PHI, as required by HIP AA.207 
Specifically, the court referred to the New Jersey Supreme Court case 
of Stempler v. Speidel!, which established three privacy requirements 
when defense counsel conducted ex parte interviews.208 Although the 
200. Id. at 241; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v)(A)-(B). 
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v)(A)-(B). 
202. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm., 855 A.2d 608, 609 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003). 
203. Id. at 622-23 (stating that "[o]ne area where state law is more stringent than HIPAA is 
related to mental health care practice"). 
204. Id. at 623. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 619. 
208. Id. at 612 (citing Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857,864 (N.J. 1985)). When defense 
counsel conducts ex parte interviews, counsel must: (I) provide plaintiffs counsel 
with reasonable notice as to the time and place of the interview, (2) provide the 
physician with a description of the anticipated scope of the conversation, and (3) 
2015 HIP AA, The Privacy Rule, and Informal Discovery 515 
Smith court recognized these privacy requirements, the court also 
acknowledged that just as in HIP AA, New Jersey statutory law 
"carries an exception for civil litigation. "Z09 While the Smith court 
reasoned that changes in "discovery techniques [are] not a role for 
this court," in deciding whether "HIP AA preempt[ ed] informal 
discovery techniques," the court concluded resoundingly that the 
"[t]he answer is plainly 'no."'ZIO Notwithstanding this rationale, the 
Smith court ultimately rejected the defendant's request for ex parte 
communication on the grounds of judicial economy, not privacy 
constraints. Z\1 
In addition to reserving ex parte grants to state courts, courts have 
questioned whether or not ex parte communication even falls under 
the "judicial proceedings" exception to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).212 In 
the case of State ex rei. Proctor v. Messina, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri sitting en banc provided a thorough analysis of HIPAA's 
"judicial proceedings" exception.213 Of the greatest concern for the 
Proctor court was the term's varying definition depending of the 
context of its use.Z14 After significant discussion of the multiple 
contexts in which a "judicial proceeding" can occur, the Proctor 
court ultimately found that "45 C.F.R. 164.512(e), which permits 
disclosures in the course of judicial proceedings, does not apply to a 
meeting for ex parte communications, and consequently, a trial court 
has no authority to issue a purported HIPAA order .... "215 
The aforementioned cases more than adequately illustrate the 
confusion HIP AA and the Privacy Rule generate. While HIP AA was 
promulgated as a device to protect medical information in the face of 
numerous electronic advancements, increased privacy regulations 
clearly communicate that the physician's participation is voluntary. Stempler, 495 
A.2d at 864. 
209. See Smith, 855 A.2d at 620 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (2014»; see also 
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2014). 
210. Smith, 855 A.2d at 621. 
211. See id. at 625-26. Due to the fact that there were "approximately 300 
[phenylpropanolamine tort cases] on [the] court's docket and only one and a half 
months until trial," the court found that it would be "improvident to cease discovery to 
hold extensive hearings as to what constitutes 'pertinent' medical information and/or 
cite all 'more stringent' statutory privacy constraints may apply to ex parte 
interviews." Id. at 625. 
212. See, e.g., State ex rei. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 155-56 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc); see also 45 C.F.R. § l64.512(e) (2014) (explaining what a covered entity must 
disclose throughout proceedings). 
213. Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 155-56. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
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were also an established end. However, the bewildering impact on 
state discovery practices has been an unintended collateral result. 
Through the persistence of plaintiffs' attorneys in conjunction with 
inconsistent judicial interpretations, HIP AA has unnecessarily 
become a federal symbol of instability and irresolution. 
V. A HIPAA INTERPRETATION EVERYONE CAN AGREE 
UPON? 
In the years since the promulgation of the Privacy Rule, few courts, 
if any, have effectively balanced the plaintiffs' privacy concerns with 
respect to their PHI and defendants' desire for cost effective 
discovery.216 Although ex parte communications do present a risk 
that physicians may inadvertently disclose information not related to 
the lawsuit,217 they also provide a discovery mechanism which is less 
litigious and intimidating to physicians.218 The New Jersey Superior 
Court, in Smith v. American Home Products Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst 
Pharmaceutical, issued a well-reasoned opinion wherein it 
successfully balanced the plaintiffs competing interest for privacy 
with the defendant's desire for cost effective discovery.219 The Smith 
court was able to achieve such a noteworthy conclusion through its 
determination that "informal discovery is not expressly addressed 
under HIPAA," thus permitting defense attorneys to conduct ex parte 
interviews within the privacy requirements afforded by state law.220 
While this is a valid proposal for states that already have established 
privacy protections, it begs the question: what should states do that 
do not have these preexisting requirements? 
While it is not implausible for state legislatures to amend current 
statutory law, similar to the action taken by the Tennessee State 
Legislature/21 this may not be the most prudent approach. The more 
practical option is for courts to create these protections through case 
law similar to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Stem pier v. 
Speidell.222 In fact, in several jurisdictions where HIPAA and the 
Privacy Rule are at issue, courts have established these protections 
without even realizing it. For example, in the case of Bayne v. 
Provost, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
216. See Smith y. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm, 855 A.2d 608, 617-18 
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Diy. 2003). 
217. Russ, supra note 140, at 29. 
218. Id. 
219. See Smith, A.2d at 619-27. 
220. See id. at 623. 
221. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-121(f)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
222. Stempler Y. SpeideU, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1985). 
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New York granted a qualified protective order on the basis that the 
defendant notify the physician "that the purpose of the [ex parte 
interview] is to assist . . . in defense of a lawsuit brought by the 
Plaintiff," and advise the physician that this court order "does not 
compel her to participate. ,,223 These protections are nearly parallel to 
those relied upon by the Smith COurt.224 Therefore, this Comment 
encourages future courts to adopt the logic of the Smith court in order 
to best address and effectuate the privacy and cost concerns of 
litigants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to HIPAA's 1996 enactment, more than a dozen states 
explicitly permitted varying degrees of ex parte communication 
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs' non-party treating 
physicians.225 In response to the growing need for greater patient 
privacy, HHS and Congress promulgated the Privacy Rule in order to 
better achieve HIPAA's ends.226 However, the debate over HIPAA 
has continued nearly two decades after its enactment.227 Without 
question, HIP AA and the Privacy Rule altered the ex parte dynamic, 
as demonstrated in cases such as Law and Crenshaw.228 Unlike the 
pre-HIPAA time in which a defense attorney could speak freely with 
a plaintiffs physician, the availability of informal discovery is no 
longer a certainty. 
HIP AA' s federal floor of privacy protection, combined with its 
preemption scheme, supersedes any state law that fails to afford 
patients minimum privacy protections.229 However, just because 
HIP AA preempts "less stringent" state discovery laws does not mean 
that the informal practice of ex parte communication is extinct. Yes, 
the "informal" nature has been removed from ex parte 
communications, but the practice is very much alive and well.230 
Promulgated by HHS and Congress, the judicial proceedings 
223. Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
224. Smith, 855 A.2d at 612 (citing Stemp1er v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 859-864) (N.I. 
1985)); see supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
225. Aripo/i, supra note 4, at 505-06. 
226. See supra Part II. 
227. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra Parts III, IV (citing Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D. Md. 2004); 
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2004)). 
228. See supra Parts III, IV. 
229. See supra Part lILA. 
230. See supra Parts IV.B-C, V. 
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exception to HIP AA and the Privacy Rule explicitly provide a 
mechanism in which "formal" ex parte communication is 
permissible.231 So long as the petitioning attorney satisfie.s the 
requirements contained 45 C.P.R. § 164.512(e), there is a likelihood, 
albeit not guaranteed, that ex parte communication will be ordered by 
the court. 
It is no longer necessary for the HIP AA debate to be stalled at the 
crossroads of judicial interpretation, patient privacy, and fiduciary 
concern. Under the plain language interpretation of HIP AA and the 
Privacy Rule, combined with a balancing of state law, plaintiffs are 
no longer permitted to utilize the statutes as both a sword and shield 
to deflect defense counsel's requests for ex parte communication.232 
Under the interpretation set forth in this Comment, both plaintiffs and 
defendants now stand on equal footing with respect to ex parte 
communication. 
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